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 Abstract—Due to the vulnerability of civilian global positioning 
system (GPS) signals, the accuracy of phasor measurement units 
(PMUs) can be greatly compromised by GPS spoofing attacks 
(GSAs), which introduce phase shifts into true phase angle 
measurements. Focusing on simultaneous GSAs for multiple PMU 
locations, this paper proposes a novel identification and correction 
algorithm in distribution systems. A sensitivity analysis of state 
estimation residuals on a single GSA phase angle is firstly 
implemented. An identification algorithm using a probing 
technique is proposed to determine the locations of spoofed PMUs 
and the ranges of GSA phase shifts. Based on the identification 
results, these GSA phase shifts are determined via an estimation 
algorithm that minimizes the mismatch between measurements 
and system states. Further, with the attacked PMU data corrected, 
the system states are recovered. Simulations in unbalanced IEEE 
34-bus and 123-bus distribution systems demonstrates the 
efficiency and accuracy of the proposed method. 
 
Index Terms—State estimation, phasor measurement units, 
multiple GPS spoofing attacks, unbalanced distribution systems, 
attack identification and correction. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
YBER security is a critical issue for the reliability of power 
networks [1]. The 2015 Ukraine blackout was a first-of-its-
kind cyber incident that resulted in nationwide power outages 
covering 225,000 customers for several hours. Motivated by 
this event, increasing amounts of research are being carried out 
on this issue, especially the cyber-attacks against phasor 
measurement units (PMUs) [2]. Also, installation of PMUs 
increasingly makes dramatic changes to the landscape of power 
grid operation and enables more-accurate state estimation [3]. 
   Wide use of advanced information and communication 
technology creates opportunities for global positioning system 
(GPS) spoofing attacks (GSAs) against PMUs that rely on 
civilian GPS timing signals. GSAs compromise the 
synchronization of measuring devices by introducing forged 
GPS signals [4]. The approaches that GSAs manipulate the GPS 
signals to introduce phase offsets into PMU data are 
demonstrated in [5] and [6], where the experimental and 
theoretical feasibility were verified. Moreover, the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation reported a real-world 
GSA in 2012 [7]. As a result, GSAs create the mismatch 
between the measured and true phase angles of synchronous 
data; these negate the effectiveness of PMU measurements. 
Recent studies on GSAs mainly focus on two issues: (1) the 
impacts and analysis of GSAs (e.g., [5], [8], and [9]), and (2) 
detection and correction for GSAs in transmission systems 
(e.g., [10]–[13]). For example, a detection mechanism for 
multiple spoofing attacks is proposed from a physical 
perspective in [10]. This mechanism requires another 
commercial GPS receiver to be installed close to the existing 
one in a PMU. Most bad data detection techniques directly 
remove bad data once detected, provided that there is a certain 
level of measurement redundancy, and that these bad data 
individually occur. However, removing the spoofed data under 
multiple GSAs may cause the system unobservable, as a single 
GSA can not only compromise the voltage phasor at a bus but 
also the current phasors of several branches connected to the 
attacked bus. Hence, the authors of [11] presented a correction 
algorithm for a single GSA in transmission systems with only 
PMU measurements, and this method performs the generalized 
likelihood ratio tests presented in [12] for correcting the GSA 
on each candidate PMU. However, the number of PMUs in 
distribution systems is insufficient to make the entire system 
observable due to technical and economic limits. Moreover, this 
algorithm cannot achieve correction for multiple GSAs. Risbud 
et al. [13] proposed an alternating minimization algorithm for 
these unknown spoofed PMU locations and phase angels for the 
attack reconstruction of multiple GSAs. Beyond these 
mentioned works focusing on the countermeasures to GPS 
spoofing, other works on the attack identification for PMUs in 
transmission systems include [14] and [15], which have specific 
requirements for the amount of PMU data. For instance, [14] 
requires continuous PMU measurements across time for 
dynamic state estimation, and [15] realizes the PMU data 
recovery specifically focusing on a transmission line equipped 
with two PMUs at both ends. 
As reviewed in [16], distribution systems are also vulnerable 
to cyber-attacks due to their direct connections to customer 
loads and emerging distributed generators (DGs). However, the 
existing state estimation-based algorithms in transmission 
systems cannot be trivially applied to unbalanced distribution 
systems with high r/x ratios [3]. Moreover, in contrast to 
extensive works regarding the cyber-attacks against state 
estimation in transmission systems, in the literature, only a 
handful of studies (e.g., [17] – [21]) address the cyber-attack 
issues in distribution networks. For example, the impact of 
cyber-attacks on voltage regulation is considered in [17] with 
photovoltaic (PV) devices connected. Recently, the authors of 
[20] proposed a false data injection attack mechanism against 
distribution system state estimation (DSSE) in balanced 
systems from an attacker’s point of view. Then, they extended 
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[20] to multiphase and unbalanced distribution systems in [21], 
since the multiphase and unbalanced natures are typical features 
of practical systems and demand further research. However, 
these existing studies focus on the construction of cyber-attacks 
and thus do not yet address the correction of GSAs against PMU 
data, and the related research in transmission systems such as 
[11] – [14] cannot be applied to unbalanced distribution 
systems. Hence, with more distribution-level PMUs installed in 
systems, the identification and correction of GSAs in 
unbalanced distribution systems call for solutions. 
This paper proposes a novel algorithm to identify and correct 
the corrupted PMU data under multiple GSAs in unbalanced 
distribution systems. Compared with a single GSA, multiple 
GSAs refer to those GSAs that are simultaneously launched on 
multiple PMU locations [13]. It is observed that the meters 
located in substations with higher cyber-security could be more 
challenging to access by attackers [16]. The proposed algorithm 
of GSAs is based on this observation, which is supported in 
Section Ⅲ-A. This paper presents an identification method 
using a probing technique, and probing is defined as the 
technique of perturbing measurements to find the locations of 
spoofed PMUs and the ranges of GSA phase shifts. The idea of 
probing is widely adopted in algorithmic applications to power 
system operation, e.g., topology identification of distribution 
networks in [22]. Based on the identification method, these 
GSA phase shifts are obtained by minimizing the mismatch 
between all the measurements and state variables. Further, with 
the attacked PMU data corrected, the system states are 
recovered. 
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: 
 The proposed method enables the identification and 
correction of multiple GSAs by using DSSE algorithms with 
PMU measurements and smart meter data. The hybrid 
measurement deployment becomes pervasive for current 
distribution networks, which is not fully accounted for in the 
existing literature. Moreover, the algorithm is not limited by 
the number of spoofed PMU locations.  
 The proposed algorithm is hierarchical and more efficient. 
Specifically, the proposed identification method first 
determines the locations of attacked PMUs and the 
magnitude ranges of GSA phase shifts, then accelerates the 
subsequent correction process. 
 This algorithm is applied to multiphase and unbalanced 
distribution systems and considers the impacts of DG 
penetration. 
 The proposed identification method has no requirement for 
additional hardware and could be transplanted before other 
correction algorithms. 
II.  PRELIMINARY 
A.  DSSE Integrating PMU Data 
In a classical state estimator, the relationship between 
measurements and state variables is expressed as:  
 𝒛 = 𝒉(𝒙) + 𝒆                                      (1) 
 
where 𝒛 is a measurement vector, and 𝒛 ∈ Թ𝑚×1; 𝒉(𝒙) is the 
measurement function about the state vector 𝒙, and 𝒙 ∈ Թ𝑛×1; 
the measurement noise vector 𝒆 ~ 𝑁(0,𝑹) follows Gaussian 
distributions with the covariance matrix 𝑹 =𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔[𝜎12, 𝜎22, … , 𝜎𝑚2 ], where 𝜎𝑗2 represents the variance of the 𝑗 th measurement noise, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚 , and the measurement 
weight matrix is defined as 𝑾 = 𝑹−1. 
A weighted least square (WLS) criterion is used to minimize 
the sum of weighted measurement residuals (WMRs), 𝐽 :  
 
  𝐽 = [𝒛 − 𝒉(𝒙)]𝑇 𝑾[𝒛 − 𝒉(𝒙)] = 𝒓𝑇 𝑾𝒓                (2) 
 
where 𝒓 = 𝒛 − 𝒉(𝒙) is the measurement residual vector, and [∙]𝑇  denotes the transpose of vectors or matrices. 
The estimated state vector is obtained by Newton’s method 
until ∆𝒙 at iteration 𝑡 is less than a pre-set tolerance: 
 ∇𝐽 = 0                                          (3) 
∆𝒙 = (𝑯(𝒙𝑡)𝑇 𝑾𝑯(𝒙𝑡))−1𝑯(𝒙𝑡)𝑇 𝑾[𝒛 − 𝒉(𝒙𝑡)] 
𝒙𝑡+1 = 𝒙𝑡 + ∆𝒙                        
 
where 𝑯(𝒙𝑡)  is the Jacobian matrix and 𝑯(𝒙𝑡) =𝜕𝒉(𝒙𝑡) 𝜕𝒙𝑡⁄ . 
Developed from the classical estimator, an efficient DSSE 
method integrating PMU and smart meter data proposed in [23] 
is used in this paper. In this DSSE algorithm, the voltage at the 
substation bus and branch currents are chosen as state variables. 
A general three-phase distribution line model is shown in Fig.1, 
and the state variables of the three-phase system are expressed 
in rectangular coordinates:  
 
 𝒙 = [𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑟𝑎 , 𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑥𝑎 ,… , 𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑥ܿ , 𝑖1𝑟𝑎 , 𝑖1𝑥𝑎 ,⋯ , 𝑖𝑁𝑥𝑐 ]𝑇 

where 𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑟 ߮ and 𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑥 ߮ are the real and imaginary parts of  
the three-phase substation voltage, and 𝑖𝑝𝑟߮  and 𝑖𝑝𝑥߮  are the real 
and imaginary parts of the three-phase current at branch 𝑝, 𝑝 =1,… ,𝑁 ; the superscripts 𝜑 ∈ {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} denote phase indices.  
In this estimator, smart meters provide the power data at 
load/DG buses, while PMUs record the measurements of the 
magnitudes and phase angles of voltages and currents. 
Moreover, the relationship between the measurement functions 
and these measurements are listed below: 
 
{ℎ𝑉𝑘𝑟(𝑥) = 𝑧𝑉𝑘𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝝍𝑉ℎ𝑉𝑘𝑥(𝑥) = 𝑧𝑉𝑘𝑥 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝝍𝑉                      (7) 
{ℎ𝐼𝑝𝑟(𝑥) = 𝑧𝐼𝑝𝑟 ,   𝑝 ∈ 𝝍𝐼ℎ𝐼𝑝𝑥(𝑥) = 𝑧𝐼𝑝𝑥 ,   𝑝 ∈ 𝝍𝐼                       (8) 
 {ℎ𝑃𝑘(𝑥) = 𝑧𝑃𝑘,   𝑘 ∈ 𝝍𝑆ℎ𝑄𝑘(𝑥) = 𝑧𝑄𝑘,   𝑘 ∈ 𝝍𝑆                      (9) 
  
where these measurements can be expressed as 1) the real and 
imaginary parts of voltage  𝑧𝑉𝑘𝑟 and 𝑧𝑉𝑘𝑥 , 2) the real and 
imaginary parts of current 𝑧𝐼𝑝𝑟  and 𝑧𝐼𝑝𝑥 , and 3) the active and 
reactive powers 𝑧𝑃𝑘 and  𝑧𝑄𝑘 ;  ℎ𝑉𝑘𝑟(𝑥) , ℎ𝑉𝑘𝑥(𝑥) , ℎ𝐼𝑝𝑟(𝑥) , ℎ𝐼𝑝𝑥(𝑥) , ℎ𝑃𝑘(𝑥) , and ℎ𝑄𝑘(𝑥) are the corresponding 
measurement functions; 𝑘 is the index of buses, and 𝑝 is the 
index of branches; 𝝍𝑉  and 𝝍𝑆 denote the sets of the buses with 
the voltage and power measurements, and 𝝍𝑰 is the set of the branches that the current measurements are located at. 
Moreover, for 𝑘 ∈ 𝝍𝑆 , the measurements at load/DG nodes are converted into equivalent currents by 
 
𝑧𝐼𝑘𝑟𝑒𝑞 + 𝑗𝑧𝐼𝑘𝑥𝑒𝑞 = [𝑧𝑃𝑘 + 𝑗𝑧𝑄𝑘𝑉𝑘 ]
∗                (10) 
 
where 𝑧𝐼𝑘𝑟𝑒𝑞  and 𝑧𝐼𝑘𝑥𝑒𝑞  are the real and imaginary parts of the 
equivalent injection current at bus 𝑘 , and 𝑉𝑘  is the voltage 
phasor at this bus; [∙]∗ denotes the complex conjugate. 
The measurement vector 𝒛 is expressed as 
 𝒛 = [𝒛𝑉  𝒛𝐼 𝒛𝑆]𝑇                              (11)  
where 𝒛𝑉  denotes the vector composed of the real and 
imaginary parts of three-phase voltages,  𝒛𝑉 =
[𝒛𝑉𝑘𝑟𝒛𝑉𝑘𝑥]𝑘∈𝜓𝑉 , 𝒛𝑉𝑘𝑟 = [𝑧𝑉𝑘𝑟
𝑎 , 𝑧𝑉𝑘𝑟𝑏 , 𝑧𝑉𝑘𝑟𝑐 ]𝑇 , and 𝒛𝑉𝑘𝑥 =
[𝑧𝑉𝑘𝑥𝑎 , 𝑧𝑉𝑘𝑥𝑏 , 𝑧𝑉𝑘𝑥𝑐 ]𝑇 ; 𝒛𝐼 and 𝒛𝑆 are the vectors of the real and imaginary parts of current and equivalent current 
measurements, 𝒛𝐼 = [𝒛𝐼𝑝𝑟𝒛𝐼𝑝𝑥]𝑝∈𝜓𝐼 , and 𝒛𝑆 = [
𝒛𝐼𝑘𝑟𝑒𝑞𝒛𝐼𝑘𝑥𝑒𝑞 ]𝑘∈𝜓𝑆
.  
The DSSE model with the use of PMU data has constant 
Jacobian elements, i.e., 𝑯(𝒙) = 𝑯, briefly listed below. 
1) PMU voltage measurements 
For the PMU voltage at node 𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ 𝝍𝑉 , the measurement function is expressed as 
 ℎ𝑉𝑘𝑟 + 𝑗ℎ𝑉𝑘𝑥 = (𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑟 + 𝑗𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑥) − ∑𝑝∈ℑ𝑘(𝑖𝑝𝑟 + 𝑗𝑖𝑝𝑥)𝑍𝑝         (12)   
 
where ℑ𝑘 is a set of line segments from the slack node to node 𝑘 , 𝑝 ∈ ℑ𝑘 , and 𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑟 , 𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑥 , 𝑖𝑝𝑟 , and 𝑖𝑝𝑥 are three-phase 
state vectors, e.g., 𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑟 = [ 𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑟𝑎  𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑟𝑏  𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑟𝑐 ]𝑇 ;  𝑍𝑝 is 
the 3×3 impedance matrix at branch 𝑝, expressed as: 
 
𝑍𝑝 ൌ ⎣⎢
⎡𝑍𝑎𝑎 𝑍𝑎𝑏 𝑍𝑎𝑐𝑍𝑏𝑎 𝑍𝑏𝑏 𝑍𝑏𝑐𝑍𝑐𝑎 𝑍𝑐𝑏 𝑍𝑐𝑐⎦⎥
⎤ 
 
where the diagonal and off-diagonal elements such as 𝑍𝑎𝑎 and 𝑍𝑎𝑏  represent the self-impedances and mutual impedances between two phases, illustrated as Fig.1.  See the constant 
Jacobian elements of (12) in [24]. 
2) PMU current measurements 
For the PMU current at branch 𝑝, 𝑝 ∈ 𝝍𝑰 , ℎ𝐼𝑝𝑟 + 𝑗ℎ𝐼𝑝𝑥 =𝑖𝑝𝑟 + 𝑗𝑖𝑝𝑥, and the Jacobian elements on phase 𝜑 are shown as: 
 𝜕ℎ𝐼𝑝𝑟𝜑𝜕𝑖𝑙𝑟𝛾 = {
1,  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑝 = 𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑 = 𝛾0, 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒                   
   𝜕ℎ𝐼𝑝𝑥𝜑𝜕𝑖𝑙𝑥𝛾 = {
1,  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑝 = 𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑 = 𝛾   0, 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒                     
 
where 𝑙 is the index of all branches, and the phase index 𝛾 ∈{𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}. 
3) Power measurements from smart meters 
For the powers at node 𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ 𝝍𝑆 , the Jacobian elements only has nonzero values of 1 and −1, the measurement function 
holds: 
 ℎ𝐼𝑘𝑟 + 𝑗ℎ𝐼𝑘𝑥 = 𝑖𝑖𝑛,𝑟 + 𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑛,𝑥 − ∑(𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑟 + 𝑗𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑥)   (13)   
where 𝑖𝑖𝑛,𝑟 and 𝑖𝑖𝑛,𝑥 as state variables denote the real and 
imaginary parts of the input current at node 𝑘, and 𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑟 and 𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑥 denote the output current. For simplicity, the phase 
indices are suppressed here. 
The DSSE process with this constant Jacobian matrix is 
implemented in the following steps [24]: 
1) Backward Sweep: Get the initial branch currents by a 
backward approach. An initial voltage at each node is set as a 
substation voltage 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 , and (10) is modified to calculate current injections as: 
 
𝑧𝐼𝑘𝑟𝑒𝑞 + 𝑗𝑧𝐼𝑘𝑥𝑒𝑞 = [𝑧𝑃𝑘 + 𝑗𝑧𝑄𝑘𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 ]
∗               ሺ14ሻ 
  
where these injections are used to obtain the initial branch 
currents, 𝒙0. 
2) Forward Sweep: The latest branch currents and the 
substation voltage are used to calculate the initial nodal 
voltages. 
3) In iteration 𝑡 , calculate 𝒉(𝒙𝑡), and then update system 
state variables by ∆𝒙 = (𝑯𝑇 𝑾𝑯)−1𝑯𝑇 𝑾[𝒛 − 𝒉(𝒙𝑡)] .           
 Fig.1.  Three-phase line model in distribution systems 
 
4) Update the branch currents by  𝒙𝑡+1 = 𝒙𝑡 + ∆𝒙 , then 
calculate the new nodal voltages by the forward sweep. 
5) If ∆𝒙 is less than a pre-set tolerance, stop the iterative 
process. Otherwise, use these updated voltages to calculate the 
equivalent currents by (10), then go to step 3). 
B.  Multiple GSA Model  
Multiple GSAs introduce clock offset errors to PMUs, and 
equivalently result in the phase shifts of these PMU data [8]. 
Without loss of generality, suppose that a GSA on PMU 𝑖 that 
is installed at bus 𝑘 and at branch 𝑝 introduces one clock offset 
error ∆𝑡𝑖 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝝍𝑉  and  𝑝 ∈ 𝝍𝐼 , where 𝑖=1, …,  𝑁𝑝𝑚𝑢 , and 𝑁𝑝𝑚𝑢 is the amount of the installed PMUs. The phase shift 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 corresponding to the clock offset error is denoted 
by 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 2𝜋𝑓∆𝑡𝑖[𝑟𝑎𝑑]. Hence, the GSA on a PMU affects the three-phase voltage and currents measured by the attacked 
PMU with the same phase shift [13].  
Under no attacks, the PMU voltage at node 𝑘 measured by 
PMU 𝑖 are expressed as 
 𝒛𝑉 ,𝑘 = [ |𝑉𝑘𝑎|cos𝜃𝑉 ,𝑘𝑎 , |𝑉𝑘𝑎|sin𝜃𝑉 ,𝑘𝑎 ,… , |𝑉𝑘𝑐|sin𝜃𝑉 ,𝑘𝑐 ]𝑇     (15) 
 
where 𝒛𝑉 ,𝑘 ∈ Թ6×1 , and |𝑉𝑘𝜑|  and 𝜃𝑉 ,𝑘𝜑  denote the 𝜑 -phase 
voltage magnitude and voltage phase angle at node 𝑘. 
Under GSAs, the phase angles in (15) are shifted by 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 , 
and the spoofed voltage vector 𝒛𝑉 ,𝑘𝑠𝑝𝑓  is expressed as 
 𝒛𝑉 ,𝑘𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 𝑨𝑘𝒛𝑉 ,𝑘 
      = [ |𝑉𝑘𝑎|cos(𝜃𝑉 ,𝑘𝑎 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓),… , |𝑉𝑘𝑐|sin(𝜃𝑉 ,𝑘𝜑 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)]𝑇    
(16)                           
 
where 𝒛𝑉 ,𝑘𝑠𝑝𝑓 ∈ Թ6×1 , 𝑨𝑘 = diag[𝑨𝑖𝑎,𝑨𝑖𝑏,𝑨𝑖𝑐]  , and 𝑨𝑖𝜑 =
[cos 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 − sin 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓sin 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 cos 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 ]. 
For the current at branch 𝑝, 𝑝 ∈ 𝝍𝐼 , 𝒛𝐼,𝑝𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 𝑨𝑝𝒛𝐼,𝑝, where 𝒛𝐼,𝑝 and  𝒛𝐼,𝑝𝑠𝑝𝑓 denote the normal and attacked current 
measurements, respectively, and 𝑨𝑝 = diag[𝑨𝑖𝑎,𝑨𝑖𝑏,𝑨𝑖𝑐].  
Considering GSAs on multiple PMUs, a spoofed 
measurement vector as an attack model is expressed below: 
 
   𝒛𝑠𝑝𝑓 = ⎣⎢⎡
𝑨𝑉 𝒛𝑉𝑨𝐼𝒛𝐼𝒛𝑆 ⎦⎥
⎤ = [𝑨𝑉 𝟎 𝟎𝟎 𝑨𝐼 𝟎𝟎 𝟎 𝑰][
𝒛𝑉𝒛𝐼𝒛𝑆] = 𝑨𝒛      (17) 
 
where 𝑨𝑉  and 𝑨𝐼 are the block matrices of the PMU voltage and current measurements affected by GSAs, and the diagonal 
block for smart meter data are an identity matrix, 𝑰 . The 
diagonal blocks 𝑨𝑉  and 𝑨𝐼 are expressed as  𝑨𝑉 = diag[𝑨1, . . . ,𝑨𝑘, … ]          𝑘 ∈ 𝝍𝑉        (18.a) 
𝑨𝐼 = diag[𝑨1,… ,𝑨𝑝, … ]          𝑝 ∈ 𝝍𝐼          (18.b) 
 
Under multiple GSAs, the original measurement vector 𝒛 is 
unexpectedly replaced by 𝒛𝑠𝑝𝑓  in (17). The phase shifts in 𝒛𝑠𝑝𝑓  
are unknown and arbitrarily vary in [0, 2𝜋] or [−𝜋, 𝜋]. Without 
the knowledge of 𝑨𝑉  and 𝑨𝐼 , or equivalently the locations and 
sizes of  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 , the states cannot be accurately estimated by the 
only available measurement vector 𝒛𝑠𝑝𝑓  in the attacked system. 
There is only one variable in the correction problem of a single 
GSA, while there are 𝑁  variables in the correction problem of 
multiple (𝑁 ) GSAs, and 𝑁  is unknown. Moreover, it is difficult 
for system operators to know if the attack is a single GSA or 
multiple GSAs a priori. 
III.  PROPOSED ALGORITHM 
A set of synergistic mechanism is proposed to solve the 
correction problem of multiple GSAs (coordinated1 or 
uncoordinated) in distribution systems which includes single 
GSAs as a special case. This mechanism is conducted 
hierarchically, including the identification and correction steps: 
1) The identification method for multiple GSAs first enables 
the locations of the attacked PMUs, i.e., the locations of those 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 that are not zero. Further, this algorithm determines 
narrower intervals than [−𝜋, 𝜋] that these non-zero 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓  lie in.  2) Finally, an optimization model is formulated to obtain the 
values of these 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 .  
A.  Assumption 
The proposed algorithm is based on the assumption that only 
the PMU in a substation is secure, i.e., free of GSAs. 
Consequently, 𝑨1  is an identity matrix with 𝜃1𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 0 in (18). Secure measurements protected from attacks could be 
obtained via a combination of encryption, authentication tags, 
continuous monitoring, and other tactics [26]. Moreover, 
substation measurements generally have higher cyber-security 
due to additional measurement protection schemes and data 
authentication. For instance, [27] explores currently available 
security solutions and studies their applicability to substations, 
while [28] as an industrial standard is published in 2007, and 
describes data security mechanisms to be deployed in current 
substations. Moreover, the security protocols against cyber-
attacks in distribution automation systems are proposed in [29]. 
Besides, the assumption of secure measurements has been 
used in existing algorithmic studies (e.g., [26] and [30]). For 
instance, [30] proposes a robust detection method for bad data 
injection with a number of secure PMU measurements. Also, 
the assumption in the proposed method that there is only one 
secure PMU in a substation is modest and practical. 
B.  Linear DSSE Algorithm 
Owing to the constant Jacobian matrix in Section Ⅱ-A, the 
general formula (4) is updated with 𝒉(𝒙) = 𝑯𝒙. Also, to avoid 
1Coordinated GSAs are a type of coordinated or unobservable attacks, 
which are defined as the attacks that are well designed and coordinated to 
enable passing the bad measurement detection by evaluating the 
measurement residual 𝐽(?̂?) [25].  
 
the iterative estimation process in Section Ⅱ-A, the nodal 
voltages in (10) are fixed as 𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘  to obtain the equivalent current measurements, i.e., (14). Then, a closed-form solution 
in the DSSE method is estimated as [21]:    
     ?̂? = (𝑯𝑇 𝑾𝑯)−1𝑯𝑇 𝑾𝒛 = 𝑮−1𝑯𝑇 𝑾𝒛            (19) 
𝒓 = 𝒛 − 𝑯?̂? = 𝑲𝒛                              (20) 
 
where 𝑮  is the gain matrix of this estimator, and 𝑮 =𝑯𝑇 𝑾𝑯 ;  𝑲 = 𝑰 − 𝑯𝑮−1𝑯𝑇 𝑾 , and 𝑲  is defined as a 
residual sensitivity matrix and remains invariable due to known 
network structures and parameters.  
The closed-form DSSE algorithm is adopted in the 
identification method of Section Ⅲ-C due to its high 
computational efficiency. 
C.  Identification of Multiple GSAs 
In this subsection, the probing technique is performed on 
each PMU in parallel, where probing is defined as the technique 
of perturbing measurements for identification, i.e., finding the 
unknown locations of spoofed PMUs and narrowing down the 
searching ranges of the GSA phase shifts. The attacked PMU 
locations are determined at this stage, regardless of whether this 
PMU coordinates with other PMUs or not, i.e., the proposed 
algorithm is robust against coordinated attacks. 
Definition 1 (Test dataset for identification on PMU  𝑖 ). 
Define 𝑵𝑖 = 𝑴𝑖 ∪ 𝑺 as the test dataset for the identification 
on PMU 𝑖 , where 𝑴𝑖  is the set of the measurements from 
PMU  𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {2,… , 𝑁𝑝𝑚𝑢} , and 𝑺  denotes the secure 
measurement set from the substation PMU and smart meters.  
There are only two remaining PMUs in 𝑵𝒊 besides all smart meters. Also, due to the existence of the secure substation PMU, 
there is at most one PMU under GSAs in 𝑵𝑖, and 𝑵𝑖 as the subset of all measurements still meets the system observability 
due to the radial nature of distribution systems.  
 
Based on (20), the measurement residual between system 
variables and the measurements in 𝑵𝑖 is expressed as:  𝒓0 = 𝑲𝜌𝒛𝜌 = 𝑲𝜌[𝒛𝑉𝜌  𝒛𝐼𝜌 𝒛𝑆]𝑇                  (21)                                       
where 𝒛𝑉𝜌  and 𝒛𝐼𝜌 are the voltage and current vectors measured 
by the substation PMU and PMU 𝑖, and  𝒛𝑉𝜌 = [𝒛𝑉,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝒛𝑉,𝑘 ], 𝒛𝐼𝜌 =
[𝒛𝐼,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝒛𝐼,𝑝 ], and the vector elements in 𝒛𝑉𝜌  and 𝒛𝐼𝜌 are defined in 
Section Ⅱ-B; 𝑲𝜌 denotes the residual sensitivity matrix of 𝑵𝑖. 
GSAs introduce 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 to the data measured by PMU 𝑖, and the measurement residual under the GSA is expressed as 
 
              𝒓𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 𝑲𝜌[𝒛𝑉′  𝒛𝐼′  𝒛𝑺]𝑇                          (22) 
 
where 𝒛𝑉′  and 𝒛𝐼′   denote the voltage and current  measurement 
vectors under this GSA, and 𝒛𝑽′ = [𝒛𝑉,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑨𝑘𝒛𝑉,𝑘], 𝒛𝐼′ = [
𝒛𝐼,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑨𝑝𝒛𝐼,𝑝 ]. 
Substitute (22) into (2), and the sum of WMRs under this 
GSA is calculated by 
 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) = 𝒓𝑠𝑝𝑓𝑇 𝒘𝒓𝑠𝑝𝑓                      (23) 
 
where  𝒘  denotes the weight matrix of 𝑵𝑖 , and 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) 
depends on the only variable  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 . 
Theorem 1 (Unimodality of 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)). For 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 ∈ [-π, π], 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)  is a unimodal function with respect to 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 . With  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 =0, i.e., there is no attacks, 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)  has a unique 
minimum 𝐽0, and 𝐽0 = 𝒓0𝑇 𝒘𝒓0. 
Proof: See the appendix. 
By designing the test datasets 𝑵𝑖, the potential coordinated attacks in the original measurement set transform into 
uncoordinated single GSA attacks on 𝑵𝑖, which are easier to 
detect. Also, Theorem 1 is built on 𝑵𝑖 and conveniently used for the subsequent probing technique. 
 
The proposed probing technique is described that a pair of 
phase angles ±∆𝜃(∆𝜃 > 0) as probing signals are superposed 
onto 𝑵𝑖  to generate auxiliary measurement sets for the subsequent identification. The auxiliary measurement sets 𝑵𝑖+ and 𝑵𝑖−  are expressed as {𝒛𝑉+, 𝒛𝐼+ , 𝒛𝑆} and  {𝒛𝑉− , 𝒛𝐼− , 𝒛𝑆} , where 𝒛𝑉+ = 𝑨+𝒛𝑉′ ,  and  𝒛𝐼+ = 𝑨+𝒛𝐼′ ;  𝒛𝑉− = 𝑨−𝒛𝑉′  , 
and  𝒛𝐼− = 𝑨−𝒛𝐼′ ; 𝑨+ = [cos∆𝜃 − sin ∆𝜃sin ∆𝜃 cos∆𝜃 ] , and 𝑨− =
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Fig. 2.  Schematic diagram of phase measurement noise and bad data 
 
 
TABLE I 
TRUTH TABLE OF IDENTIFICATION METHOD 
 
PMU 𝑖  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓  𝐽𝑖+ 𝐽𝑖− 𝑎𝑖 
No GSAs  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 0 ↑ ↑ 0 
Under GSAs 
 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 ∈ (0, π) ↑ ↓ 
1  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = π ↓ ↓  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 ∈ (−π, 0) ↓ ↑ ↑ and ↓ indicate rising and descending residuals relative to 𝐽𝑖  
 [cos(−∆𝜃) sin ∆𝜃sin (−∆𝜃) cos (−∆𝜃)]; The phase index 𝜑 is suppressed 
for simplicity. 
Suppose 𝐽𝑖 = 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) ,  𝐽𝑖+ = 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 +∆𝜃) , and 𝐽𝑖− =𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 − ∆𝜃) , and 𝐽𝑖+ and 𝐽𝑖−  are calculated by (2) based 
on 𝑵𝑖+  and 𝑵𝑖− , respectively. Further, two identification corollaries are used to obtain the truth table shown in Table I, 
where 𝑎𝑖 is a binary indicator, and 𝑎𝑖 = 1 if PMU 𝑖 is attacked, 
and 𝑎𝑖 = 0  otherwise. Specifically, Corollary 1 is used to identify the locations of non-attack PMUs, while Corollary 2 
narrows down the ranges of phase shifts at attacked PMUs. 
 
Corollary 1. For PMU 𝑖, if 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 0 and  0 < 2𝛼 < ∆𝜃 <2𝜋 − 2𝛼, then 𝐽𝑖+ > 𝐽𝑖 and 𝐽𝑖− > 𝐽𝑖 . Here, 𝛼  is the known 
maximum phase measurement error required by the IEEE 
Standard for PMU accuracy, i.e., 0.01 rad [31]. 
Proof: Based on Theorem 1, if 0 < 2𝛼 < ∆𝜃 < 2𝜋 − 2𝛼, 
the following characteristics hold: 
 
{ 𝛼 < 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 + ∆𝜃 + 𝑒𝑖 < 2𝜋 − 𝛼𝛼 − 2𝜋 < 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 − ∆𝜃 + 𝑒𝑖 < −𝛼 ↔  𝐽𝑖
+ > 𝐽𝑖 , 𝐽𝑖− > 𝐽𝑖 
 
where 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 0 , and  𝑒𝑖  denotes the inherent phase 
measurement noise on PMU 𝑖 and obeys a known Gaussian 
distribution, – 𝛼 < 𝑒𝑖 < 𝛼. The schematic diagram of noises 
and bad data is shown in Fig. 2.																																																					∎ 
Remark 1. In the case that PMU  𝑖  is not attacked, the 
probing is equivalent to launching an extra “GSA attack” on 
this non-attack PMU, rather than a noise-level signal. Such a 
probing signal leads to a larger measurement residual, and 
therefore, ∆𝜃 > 2𝛼 is required. 
Corollary 2. For PMU  𝑖 , if  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 ∈ (0, 𝜋) , then 𝐽𝑖+ >𝐽𝑖 and 𝐽𝑖− < 𝐽𝑖; if  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 ∈ (−𝜋, 0), then 𝐽𝑖+ < 𝐽𝑖  and 𝐽𝑖− >𝐽𝑖; if 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 𝜋, then 𝐽𝑖+ < 𝐽𝑖 and 𝐽𝑖− < 𝐽𝑖. 
Proof: Combined with 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) ≥ 𝐽𝑖  in [−𝜋, 𝜋] and 𝐽𝑖 =𝐽0  at 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 0 , 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) monotonically increases in [0, 𝜋 ], 
while monotonically decreasing in [−𝜋, 0].  
According to the monotonicity of 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) in  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 ∈ (0, 𝜋), 
we have 
 𝜋 > 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 + ∆𝜃 > 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 > 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 − ∆𝜃 > 0 ↔ 𝐽𝑖+ > 𝐽𝑖 > 𝐽𝑖−   
The opposite occurs for 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 ∈ (−𝜋, 0). 
If 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 𝜋, 𝐽𝑖 = 𝐽(𝜋) = 𝐽(−𝜋), and it is derived that  0 < 𝜋 − ∆𝜃 < 𝜋 ↔  𝐽(𝜋 − ∆𝜃) < 𝐽(𝜋)  ↔ 𝐽𝑖− < 𝐽𝑖   −𝜋 < ∆𝜃 − 𝜋 < 0 ↔ (∆𝜃 − 𝜋) = 𝐽(𝜋 + ∆𝜃) < 𝐽(𝜋) ↔ 𝐽𝑖+ < 𝐽𝑖																																															∎ 
Remark 2. The size of the probing signal ∆𝜃 in Corollary 2 
requires meeting ∆𝜃 < 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 , which is not difficult to achieve, 
since these phase shifts are usually significant [11], [13]. 
Typical spoofed phase angles such as 52°, 60° and 70° are 
reported in [5], [8], and [9]. For instance, in [5], a GSA model 
is formulated by maximizing the difference ∆𝑡𝑖  between the 
spoofed clock offset and the pre-attack clock offset, which 
results in the maximum GSA phase angle according to 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 =2𝜋𝑓∆𝑡𝑖. Also, if  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 < ∆𝜃, the original influence of 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓  on 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) may be neutralized, even overtaken by ∆𝜃. In such a 
case, whether the identification results are caused by 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓  or ∆𝜃 cannot be determined. As a result, the identification method 
fails to reflect the true interval that 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓  falls in. 
In order to successfully realize the above identification, it is 
concluded that 0 < 2𝛼 < ∆𝜃 ≪ ∣𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 ∣  should hold. The 
identification procedure is shown in the following pseudo-code, 
where 𝑷1 , 𝑷2 , and 𝑷3 represent the category sets of these 
identified PMUs, and 𝑷1 = {𝑖|𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 𝜋} ,  𝑷2 = {𝑖|𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 ∈(0, 𝜋)}, 𝑷3 = {𝑖|𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 ∈ (−𝜋, 0)}. 
D.  Correction of Spoofed PMU Data 
The spoofed PMU locations are determined by the above 
identification method, and the searching scale of each GSA 
phase shift is explicitly determined according to Table I. With 
Identification Procedure 
1  Inputs: Measurements 𝑺 and 𝑴𝑖. 
2  Parameters: System model, 𝑨+, and 𝑨−. 
3  Initialization: 𝑷1 = {},𝑷2 = {},𝑷3 = {} 
4  for each PMU location 𝑖 do 
5 
6 
7 
 
𝑵𝑖 ← 𝑺 ∪ 𝑴𝑖 
Calculate 𝐽𝑖, 𝐽𝑖+, and 𝐽𝑖−. 
     if     𝐽𝑖+/𝐽𝑖 > 1 && 𝐽𝑖−/𝐽𝑖 > 1 
    𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 0 
    else if 𝐽𝑖+/𝐽𝑖 < 1 && 𝐽𝑖−/𝐽𝑖 < 1 
    𝑷1 ← 𝑷1 ∪ {𝑖} and  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = π     
   else if  𝐽𝑖+/𝐽𝑖 > 1&& 𝐽𝑖−/𝐽𝑖 < 1 
     𝑷2 ← 𝑷2 ∪ {𝑖}and   𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 ∈ (0, 𝜋) 
   else if  𝐽𝑖+/𝐽𝑖 < 1 && 𝐽𝑖−/𝐽𝑖 > 1 
     𝑷3 ← 𝑷3 ∪ {𝑖}and 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 ∈ (−𝜋, 0) 
    end 
8  end 
9  return 𝑷1, 𝑷2  , and 𝑷3 
 
the knowledge of the locations and ranges of  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 , the 
correction algorithm introduces the inverse matrix of 𝑨  to 
minimize the mismatch between system states and all 
measurements. 
The inverse matrix of 𝑨 could be obtained with all non-zero  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓  estimated, and the measurement vector is corrected as:  𝒛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 𝑨−1𝒛𝑠𝑝𝑓                           (24) 
 
where 𝑨−1 is also a block diagonal matrix and composed of 
block submatrices according to the property of the block 
diagonal matrix 𝑨. The blocks associated with PMU 𝑖 in 𝑨−𝟏  
are expressed as 
 
                   (𝑨𝑖𝜑)−1 = [ cos 𝜃𝑖
𝑠𝑝𝑓 sin 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓−sin 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 cos 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓]      
The measurement residual with the correction of all PMU 
measurements is obtained by 
 
 𝒓𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 𝒛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 − 𝑯𝒙𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟                     (25)    
where 𝒙𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 as the corrected state vector is accurately obtained by the iterative estimation process in Section Ⅱ-A. 
The sum of WMRs is calculated as: 
 
 𝐽𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 𝒓𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑇 𝑾𝒓𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 𝑓 (𝜃1𝑠𝑝𝑓 , 𝜃2𝑠𝑝𝑓 , … , 𝜃𝑁𝑝𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑓 )    (26) 
 
These phase shifts are obtained by minimizing 𝐽𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟  to recover the system states: 
 (𝜃1𝑠𝑝𝑓 , 𝜃2𝑠𝑝𝑓 ,… , 𝜃𝑁𝑝𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑓 ) = arg min 𝐽𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟         (27.a) 𝑠. 𝑡.      𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 0                   ∀𝑖 ∉ 𝑷1 ∪ 𝑷2 ∪ 𝑷3      (27.b) 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 𝜋                       ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑷1            (27.c) 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = (0, 𝜋)                  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑷2           (27.d) 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = (−𝜋, 0)                ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑷3           (27.e)  
where 𝑷1, 𝑷2  , and 𝑷3 are determined in advance. The solution of (27) enables the recovery of the phase angles 
from spoofed PMUs. Most optimization problems in DSSE are 
non-convex, considering the quadratic characteristics of 
objective functions, which are established by a WLS criterion, 
and the nonlinearity of the measurement residual about decision 
variables in these optimization models. Consequently, heuristic 
search algorithms are widely used in DSSE, such as [32] – [34]. 
Particle swam optimization (PSO) is employed to solve (27), 
and the variables in (27.d) and (27.e) as particles float in the 
corresponding ranges. The detailed implementation of PSO can 
be found in [34, Chapter 4]. 
It is noted that according to the identification results in (27.b-
e), the amount of unknown variables in (27) decreases. The 
GSA phase shifts on PMU 𝑖  (𝑖 ∈ 𝑷2 ∪ 𝑷3) are reserved as unknown variables, while the values of the remaining phase 
shifts are fixed as 0 or 𝜋. The risk of the solution being trapped 
in a local minima is reduced by: 1) the proposed identification 
method, which narrows down the searching locations and 
ranges of GSA phase shifts prior to the subsequent correction 
algorithm, 2) increasing the amount of particles in the PSO 
algorithm and the maximum iteration times [34]. 
IV.  SIMULATION TEST 
The proposed algorithm is tested on the unbalanced IEEE 
34-bus, 24.9 kV and 123-bus, 4.16 kV distribution networks 
[35], shown in Fig.3. The nominal capacities of the 34-bus and 
123-bus systems are 2500 kVA and 5000 kVA, respectively. 
The following conditions are applied to the maximum errors of 
measurements that obey Gaussian distributions, and the 
standard deviation of a particular measurement is one-third of 
the corresponding maximum error [24]: 
  
 (a) 
  (b) 
 
Fig. 3. Schematic diagrams of (a) the 34-bus system (b) the 123-bus 
system.  
 
TABLE II 
PMU PLACEMENT LOCATIONS 
 
System Scale Buses with PMUs Measurement Redundancy 
34-bus 800, 816, 820, 836, 854, 858 1.324 
123-bus 149, 14, 18, 25, 60, 76, 97, 110 1.126 
 
 1)  PMU measurements: 1% of true values of voltages and 
currents for magnitudes and 1 crad (10-2 rad) for phase angles 
[31]. Table II and Fig.3 give the PMU placement profile. 
2)  Smart meter measurements: 3% of true values for active 
and reactive powers. The smart meters, which become available 
for distribution grids owing to their cheap costs, are assumed to 
be installed at each load bus [36].  
All test cases run for 100 times of Monte Carlo trials. Three 
types of scenarios are tested. 
Scenario 1: Single GSA  
 (a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Fig. 4.  Identification results (a) in Scenario 1. (b) in Scenario 2. (c) in Scenario 3. 
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 Scenario 2: Multiple GSAs with same phase shifts  
Scenario 3: Multiple GSAs with different phase shifts 
Scenarios 1 and 2 are jointly designed to illustrate that the 
proposed algorithm is applicable to not only a single GSA but 
also multiple GSAs. Scenarios 2 and 3 are jointly designed to 
verify that this algorithm is not influenced by the magnitudes of 
GSA phase shifts. Define 𝝍 as a set of GSA phase shifts in all 
scenarios, and the first element in 𝝍 is always zero, since the 
substation PMU is immune to GSAs. 
A.  Identification of Multiple GSAs  
To verify the correctness of the identification method, three 
types of scenarios in the 34-bus system are designed as follows: 
Scenario 1: 𝝍 (0, 0, 0.5π, 0, 0, 0) 
Scenario 2: 𝝍 (0, -0.5π, -0.5π, -0.5π, -0.5π, -0.5π) 
Scenario 3: 𝝍 (0, 0, -0.5π, 0.2π, -0.1π, 4.9π)  
In each scenario, 𝐽𝑖+/𝐽𝑖 and 𝐽𝑖−/𝐽𝑖 on PMU 𝑖, respectively corresponding to the positive and negative probing signals, are 
compared with 1, and the identification results in 100 Monte 
Carlo trials are shown in Fig. 4. In Fig. 4(a), the GSA location 
on the 3rd PMU is identified correctly, and the phase shift in 
this GSA is identified in (0, π). Moreover, all GSA locations in 
Scenarios 2 and 3 are correctly identified. In Scenario 3, 
although the last shift angle 4.9π is out of the interval [-π, π], its 
effect on DSSE in rectangular coordinates is equivalent to that 
of 0.9π. To sum up, the identification method is not influenced 
by the amount and the locations of multiple GSAs. 
B.  Identification Sensitivity 
Different combinations of probing signals and GSA phase 
shifts are tested to investigate the sensitivity of the 
identification method. Two indices, the probability of miss 
detection (PMD) and the probability of false detection (PFD), 
are utilized to evaluate the sensitivity of the identification 
method. PMD describes the probability that the algorithm fails 
in finding the locations of attacked PMUs, and PFD describes 
the probability that the non-attack PMUs are misjudged as 
maliciously spoofed. With the values of both indices closer to 
zero, this algorithm has a better identification performance. 
The average PMD and PFD are calculated as follows: 
 
PMD= 1𝑁𝑡𝑟 ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑁𝑝𝑚𝑢𝑖=2 ∑ ∑ (𝑎𝑖𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑝𝑚𝑢
𝑖=2
𝑁𝑡𝑟𝑗=1 )          (28.a) 
 
PFD= 1𝑁𝑡𝑟 ∑ (1−𝑎𝑖)𝑁𝑝𝑚𝑢𝑖=2 ∑ ∑ [(1 − 𝑎𝑖)𝛽𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑝𝑚𝑢
𝑖=2
𝑁𝑡𝑟𝑗=1 ]     (28.b) 
 
where 𝛼𝑖𝑗 and 𝛽𝑖𝑗 represent the amount of miss detection and 
false detection at PMU 𝑖 in the 𝑗th trial, respectively; 𝑁𝑡𝑟 is the 
total amount of trials, and 𝑎𝑖 is a binary indicator as before. These simulations show that PMDs in different combinations 
of the scale of probing signals and GSA phase shifts are always 
equal to zero. Fig. 5 depicts the PFD trends, where different 
combinations of ∆𝜃  and GSA phase shifts are tested in 
Scenario 1. When  ∆𝜃 is larger than 0.18 rads, the algorithm 
avoids misjudging the non-attack PMUs as attacked for all GSA 
phase shifts. The measurement errors of other meters (i.e., smart 
meters) cause these non-zero PFDs in Fig.5 and these errors are 
inevitable and have coordinated impacts along with PMU phase 
errors on the DSSE accuracy. In conclusion, the proposed 
algorithm has excellent performance in avoiding miss and false 
identification when the size of ∆𝜃  is appropriately selected. 
The threshold of ∆𝜃 can be obtained by prior knowledge and/or 
off-line probing tests based on the proposed identification 
algorithm. With the development of micro-PMUs with higher 
measurement accuracy (e.g., 0.003 degrees for the maximum 
error of phase angle [37]), the proposed method could provide 
a wider range for the sizes of ∆𝜃 to choose. 
C.  Correction Accuracy 
The average estimation errors of GSA phase shifts are used 
to evaluate the correction accuracy for multiple GSAs. They are 
calculated as 
 
𝜀 = 1𝑁𝑡𝑟 ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑁𝑝𝑚𝑢𝑖=2 ∑ ∑ (𝑎𝑖∣∆𝜃𝑡𝑟,𝑖𝑗 − ∆𝜃𝑒𝑠𝑡,𝑖𝑗∣
𝑁𝑝𝑚𝑢
𝑖=2
𝑁𝑡𝑟𝑗=1 )   (29) 
 
where ∆𝜃𝑡𝑟,𝑖𝑗 and ∆𝜃𝑒𝑠𝑡,𝑖𝑗 are the true and estimated values of 
the phase shift on PMU 𝑖 in the 𝑗th trial.  
In the 34-bus system, three types of scenarios are designed as 
Scenario 1: 𝝍(0, 𝜃2𝑠𝑝𝑓 , 0,0,0,0) 
 Fig. 5.  PFD of the identification method 
 
 
TABLE III 
ESTIMATION ERRORS IN THE 34-BUS SYSTEM 
 
Estimation Errors [rad] Scenario 1 2 3 
GSA 
Phase Shift  
[rad] 
0.1π 0.0110 0.1127 0.0505 
0.4π 0.0090 0.0211 0.0216 
0.7π 0.0122 0.0218 0.0209 
1.0π 0 0 0.0154 
1.3π 0.0095 0.0266 0.0210 
1.6 π 0.0116 0.0223 0.0217 
1.9 π 0.0092 0.1112 0.0410 
 
 
TABLE IV 
ESTIMATION ERRORS IN THE 123-BUS SYSTEM 
 
Estimation Errors [rad] Scenario  1 2 3 
GSA 
Phase Shift  
[rad] 
0.1π 0.0109 0.1120 0.1115 
0.4π 0.0106 0.0137 0.0179 
0.7π 0.0112  0.0245 0.0207 
1.0π 0  0 0.0080 
1.3π 0.0046  0.0241 0.0148 
1.6 π 0.0048 0.0174 0.0191 
1.9 π 0.0068 0.1319 0.0607 
 
 Scenario 2: 𝝍(0, 𝜃2𝑠𝑝𝑓 , 𝜃2𝑠𝑝𝑓 , 𝜃2𝑠𝑝𝑓 , 𝜃2𝑠𝑝𝑓 , 𝜃2𝑠𝑝𝑓) 
Scenario 3: 𝝍(0,−0.5𝜋,−0.5𝜋,−0.5𝜋, 𝜃5𝑠𝑝𝑓 , −0.5𝜋) 
The phase shifts 𝜃2𝑠𝑝𝑓  and 𝜃5𝑠𝑝𝑓are set to vary from 0.1π to 1.9π, and the step is 0.3π. Table III summarizes the estimation 
errors of GSA phase shifts in three scenarios. It is clear from 
Table III that these multiple GSAs with different locations and 
magnitudes are accurately corrected. The estimation results in 
the 123-bus system are shown in Table Ⅳ, which verifies the 
robustness of this algorithm when the network scale increases. 
D.  DSSE Performance  
The goal of attack correction under GSAs is to provide 
reliable measurements for power system monitoring and 
control. Therefore, the root mean square errors (RMSEs) of 
variables are utilized to evaluate the estimation performance. 
The RMSEs of voltage magnitudes and phase angles at each 
node are calculated by 
 
𝛿𝑉 ,𝑘𝜑 = √𝐸 ((𝑉?̃?𝜑−𝑉𝑘𝜑𝑉?̃?𝑝 )
2)                   (30.a) 
        
 𝛿𝜃,𝑘𝜑 = √𝐸 ((𝜃?̃?𝜑 − 𝜃𝑘𝜑)2)                   (30.b)  
 
where 𝑉𝑘𝜑  and 𝜃𝑘𝜑  denote the voltage magnitude and phase 
angle on phase 𝜑  at node 𝑘 , and 𝑉?̃?𝜑  and  𝜃?̃?𝜑   are the 
corresponding true values; 𝐸 (∙) is the expected value of these 
variables.   
Scenario 3 is tested on the 34-bus system, where the GSA 
phase shifts are set as  𝝍(0, 0,−0.5𝜋, 0.2𝜋,−0.1𝜋, 4.9𝜋)  to 
generate the spoofed measurements.  Further, the maximum of 
RMSEs in three-phase voltages obtained by (30) are selected 
and shown in Fig.6 to evaluate the estimation accuracy of the 
proposed correction algorithm. Also, Table Ⅴ lists the average 
A-phase RMSEs in these scenarios for various GSAs used in 
Section Ⅳ-C. It is shown that the proposed method enables the 
improvement of the DSSE accuracy in both magnitudes and 
phase angles by correcting multiple GSAs. 
E.  Computation Time 
Experiments for different scenarios are carried out to 
illustrate the computational efficiency of the proposed 
algorithm. They are implemented on a PC with 2.6 GHz i5, and 
8GB RAM using Matlab 2017b.  
The average computation time for various scenarios is listed 
in Table Ⅵ, where the scenario design is the same as the one in 
Section Ⅳ-C. These results indicate that the proposed 
algorithm rapidly realizes the identification and correction of 
multiple GSAs. 
F.  Impacts of DG penetration 
The impacts of DGs on the proposed algorithm are 
considered by adding DGs into the 34-bus and 123-bus 
distribution systems. The power outputs of DGs are measured 
by smart meters, and all DGs are modeled as PQ buses with a 
constant power factor of 0.95 [33]. Two wind units are installed 
on the phase 𝑎 of nodes 802 and 822 in the 34-bus system, and 
the installed capacity of each DG is 200 kW. Moreover, six DGs 
including PV and wind units are considered in the 123-bus 
system, and Table Ⅶ lists the installation details. Also, the 
 Fig. 6.  Comparison of RMSEs before and after corrections 
 
 
TABLE V 
RMSES ON PHASE 𝑎  OF DIFFERENT GSAS IN 34-BUS SYSTEM 
 
Average 
RMSES 
Scenario 
1 2 3 𝐸(𝛿𝑉 ,𝑘𝐴 ) [p.u.] 0.0139 0.0158 0.0157 𝐸(𝛿𝜃,𝑘𝐴 ) [rad] 0.0087 0.0143 0.0181 
 
TABLE Ⅵ 
COMUTATATION TIME IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS 
 
Average Computation 
Time [s] 
Scenario  
1 2 3 
GSA Phase 
Shift [rad] 
0.1π 1.928 79.48 74.60 
0.4π 1.734 65.81 67.34 
0.7π 1.690 72.47 69.11 
1.0π 0.643 0.604 66.12 
1.3π 1.609 75.02 70.59 
1.6 π 1.656 68.43 68.11 
1.9 π 1.644 75.66 75.36 
 
 
TABLE Ⅶ 
DG PLACEMENTS IN 123-BUS SYSTEM 
 
Type No. node 
Capacity 
[kW/ph] Phase Type 
No. 
node 
Capacity 
[kW/ph] Phase 
PV 14 200 𝑐 Wind 250 300  𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 
Wind 61 300 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 PV 300 200       𝑎 
Wind 151 300 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 PV 450 200       𝑎 
 
 total power outputs of DGs account for about 80% of total load 
demands. 
Table Ⅷ shows the computation time and estimation errors 
of GSA phase shifts, and a smaller-size GSA phase shift, 0.05π, 
is tested. These results show that the high accuracy of the 
proposed algorithm still firmly holds with the DG penetration. 
G.  Comparison with Other Methods 
The proposed method enables the correction of multiple 
GSAs in unbalanced distribution systems, while [11] – [13] are 
applied to transmission systems. As mentioned in Introduction, 
the existing studies on the cyber-attacks in transmission 
systems cannot be trivially extended to distribution systems. 
Also, [11] – [13] are built on the generalized likelihood ratio 
tests, where all combination of the attacked PMU locations are 
attempted to detect the presence of a GSA. For instance, in [11], 
based on the assumption of a single GSA, the best 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 for each PMU is estimated in [0, 2π), and the phase shifts of other PMUs 
except PMU 𝑖 are set as zero. The global estimation  𝜃?̂?𝑠𝑝𝑓  in [11] is obtained by 
 𝜃?̂?𝑠𝑝𝑓 = arg min𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓∈[0,2𝜋) 𝐽𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟         𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁𝑝𝑚𝑢     (31)   
As [11] one-dimensionally searches 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓  through all PMUs, 
the proposed probing method restricts the location of 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓on the exact attacked PMU efficiently. Scenario 1 is tested on the 34-
bus distribution system to demonstrate the computational 
efficiency of the proposed algorithm. The estimation results of 
this algorithm are compared with the golden section search 
from [11] in Table. Ⅸ. In the golden section search, there is no 
identification procedure for the attacked PMUs prior to this 
search in [11]. It is noted that the proposed algorithm does not 
rely on the assumption of a single GSA owing to the proposed 
probing algorithm, and this GSA is determined as a single GSA 
at the identification stage. Moreover, the location of this 
attacked PMU is determined, and the ranges of this phase shift 
on the attacked PMU shrink. Consequently, both the efficiency 
and accuracy of the proposed algorithm are improved. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes a novel algorithm for identifying and 
correcting PMU data under multiple GSAs in distribution 
systems. In contrast to a brute force search for all combinations 
of spoofed PMU locations and magnitudes of GSA phase shifts, 
which is prohibitive, the proposed algorithm is hierarchical. 
Moreover, the proposed identification method not only 
determines the locations of multiple spoofed PMUs but also 
successfully narrows down the scale for these phase shifts. 
Consequently, the computational efficiency of the subsequent 
correction for GSAs is improved. Future work focuses on the 
extension of this algorithm to false data injection attacks. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem 1: The closed-form solution of the 
estimated states used in [21] is used to prove the unimodality 
of 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) based on 𝑵𝑖 for the identification at PMU 𝑖. Given 𝐽0 = (𝑲𝜌𝒛𝜌)𝑇 𝒘(𝑲𝜌𝒛𝜌)  , where 𝒘  is a diagonal matrix, 
let  𝑴 = (𝑲𝜌)𝑇 𝒘𝑲𝜌 , and  𝑴  is a symmetric matrix. 
Reorganize 𝑴  in a block form, and  𝐽0  and  𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)  are 
calculated by 
 
𝐽0 = ⎣⎢
⎡𝒛𝑉𝜌𝒛𝐼𝜌𝒛𝑆⎦⎥
⎤𝑇
⎣⎢
⎡𝑴11 𝑴12 𝑴13𝑴21 𝑴22 𝑴23𝑴31 𝑴32 𝑴33⎦⎥
⎤
⎣⎢
⎡𝒛𝑉𝜌𝒛𝐼𝜌𝒛𝑆⎦⎥
⎤        (32)  
 
𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) = ⎣⎢
⎡𝒛𝑉′𝒛𝐼′𝒛𝑆⎦⎥
⎤𝑇
⎣⎢
⎡𝑴11 𝑴12 𝑴13𝑴21 𝑴22 𝑴23𝑴31 𝑴32 𝑴33⎦⎥
⎤
⎣⎢
⎡𝒛𝑉′𝒛𝐼′𝒛𝑆⎦⎥
⎤   (33) 
 
Define ∆𝐽(𝝌, 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) = 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) − 𝐽0  , where 𝝌 denotes 
the set of the phase angles influenced by 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 , 𝝌 ={𝜃𝑉 ,𝑘𝑎 , 𝜃𝑉 ,𝑘𝑏 , 𝜃𝑉 ,𝑘𝑐 , 𝜃𝐼,𝑝𝑎 , 𝜃𝐼,𝑝𝑏 , 𝜃𝐼,𝑝𝑐 }. It is deduced that   
 ∆𝐽(𝝌, 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) = 
[𝒛𝑉′𝒛𝐼′ ]
𝑇 [𝑴11 𝑴12𝑴21 𝑴22] [
𝒛𝑉′𝒛𝐼′ ] − [
𝒛𝑉𝜌𝒛𝐼𝜌 ]
𝑇 [𝑴11 𝑴12𝑴21 𝑴22] [
𝒛𝑉𝜌𝒛𝐼𝜌 ] +
2𝒛𝑆𝑇 𝑩([𝒛𝑉′𝒛𝐼′ ] − [
𝒛𝑉𝜌𝒛𝐼𝜌 ]) = ∑ 𝐹𝑗
4𝑗=1                                    (34) 
 𝐹1 = 𝒛𝑉′ 𝑇 𝑴11𝒛𝑉′ −𝒛𝑉𝜌𝑇 𝑴11𝒛𝑉𝜌                   (35.a) 𝐹2 = 2𝒛𝑉′ 𝑇 𝑴12𝒛𝐼′ −2𝒛𝑉𝜌 𝑇 𝑴12𝒛𝐼𝜌             (35.b) 𝐹3 = 𝒛𝐼′ 𝑇 𝑴22𝒛𝐼′ −𝒛𝐼𝜌𝑇 𝑴22𝒛𝐼𝜌                   (35.c) 
𝐹4 = 2𝒛𝑆𝑇 𝑩([𝒛𝑉′𝒛𝐼′ ] − [
𝒛𝑉𝜌𝒛𝐼𝜌 ])                    (35.d) 
TABLE Ⅷ 
COMPUTIONAL EFFICIENCY IN ACTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
 
GSA Phase Shifts 
[rad] 
34-bus System with  
DGs 
123-bus System 
with DGs 
Time [s] Error [rad] Time [s] 
Error 
[rad] 𝜃3𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 0.05π 1.58 0.0308 333.74 0.0316 𝜃2𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 0.1π 1.64 0.0110 337.18 0.0117 𝜃2𝑠𝑝𝑓 = π3 , 𝜃5𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 0.5π 45.03 0.0148 521.34 0.0151 
 
 
TABLE Ⅸ 
COMPARISON IN THE 34-BUS SYSTEM 
 
𝜓(0, 𝜃2𝑠𝑝𝑓 , 0,0,0,0) 
Estimation Errors [rad] Computing Time [s] 
Proposed 
Method [11] 
Proposed 
Method [11] 
GSA Phase 
Shift  [rad] 
0.1π 0.0110 0.0280 1.928 12.932 
0.4π 0.0090 0.0288 1.734 13.394 
0.7π 0.0122 0.0288 1.690 13.972 
1.0π 0 0.0271 0.643 12.384 
1.3π 0.0095 0.0273 1.609 12.986 
1.6 π 0.0116 0.0270 1.656 13.394 
1.9 π 0.0092 0.0251 1.644 12.846 
 
 
            
where 𝑩 = [𝑴31 𝑴32] , and  𝑴12 = 𝑴21 . 𝒛𝑉′ =
⎣⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎡ |𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑 | cos 𝜃𝑉 ,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑|𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑 | sin 𝜃𝑉 ,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑|𝑉𝑘𝜑| cos ( 𝜃𝑉 ,𝑘𝜑 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)|𝑉𝑘𝜑| sin(𝜃𝑉 ,𝑘𝜑 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)⎦
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎤ , 𝒛𝐼′ =
⎣⎢
⎢⎢
⎡ |𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑 | cos 𝜃𝐼,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑|𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑 | sin 𝜃𝐼,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑∣𝐼𝑝𝜑∣ cos(𝜃𝐼,𝑝𝜑 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)∣𝐼𝑝𝜑∣ sin ( 𝜃𝐼,𝑝𝜑 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)⎦
⎥⎥
⎥⎤ ; 𝒛𝑉𝜌 =
⎣⎢
⎢⎢
⎡|𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑 | cos 𝜃𝑉,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑|𝑉𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑 | sin 𝜃𝑉,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑|𝑉𝑘𝜑| cos 𝜃𝑉,𝑘𝜑|𝑉𝑘𝜑| sin 𝜃𝑉,𝑘𝜑 ⎦
⎥⎥⎥
⎤
, 𝒛𝐼𝜌 =
⎣⎢
⎢⎢
⎡|𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑 | cos 𝜃𝐼,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑|𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑 | sin 𝜃𝐼,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝜑∣𝐼𝑝𝜑∣ cos 𝜃𝐼,𝑝𝜑|𝐼𝑝𝜑| sin 𝜃𝐼,𝑝𝜑 ⎦
⎥⎥
⎥⎤. 
Take 𝐹1 as an example for expansion and further analysis, 
and without loss of generality, let 𝑴11 = [𝒎11 𝒎12𝒎21 𝒎22] , 
and  𝒎12 = 𝒎21 , 𝒎22 = [𝑏11 𝑏12𝑏21 𝑏22] . For simplicity, the 
auxiliary functions 𝑓1(𝜃𝑉, 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)  with the node index 𝑘  and 
phase index 𝜑  suppressed is used in the following proof 
process: 
 𝑓1 = 2𝒔𝑇 𝒎12(𝒚′ − 𝒚)൅ 𝒚′𝑇 𝒎22𝒚′ − 𝒚𝑇 𝒎22𝒚      (36)  
where  𝒔 = [cos 𝜃𝑉 ,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘sin 𝜃𝑉 ,𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘] , 𝒚 = [
cos 𝜃𝑉sin 𝜃𝑉 ]  , and  𝒚′ =
[cos(𝜃𝑉 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)sin(𝜃𝑉 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)] .  Then, (36) is further expressed as 
  𝑓1 = 𝑓11 + 𝑓12                             (37)  
where  𝑓11 = 2𝒔𝑇 𝒎12(𝒚′ − 𝒚) = 𝜆1(cos(𝜃𝑉 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) − cos 𝜃𝑉 ) +𝜆2(sin(𝜃𝑉 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) − sin 𝜃𝑉 ) + 𝜆3 ,  𝜆1 , 𝜆2 , and 𝜆3  are 
constants about 𝒔 and 𝒎12;  𝑓12 = 𝒚′𝑇 𝒎22𝒚′ − 𝒚𝑇 𝒎22𝒚 =    𝑏11 [ cos2(𝜃𝑉 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) − cos2 𝜃𝑉 ] + 𝑏22 [sin2(𝜃𝑉 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) −sin2 𝜃𝑉 ] + 𝑏12 [sin(2𝜃𝑉 + 2𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)− sin(2𝜃𝑉 )].              
To find the extreme values of 𝑓1, take a partial derivative of  𝑓1 with respect to 𝜃𝑉  , and use sum-to-product formulas in the following partial derivatives as: 
 ∂𝑓11∂𝜃𝑉 = 
[𝜆1 sin (𝜃𝑉 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓2 ) +𝜆2 cos (𝜃𝑉 + 𝜃𝑖
𝑠𝑝𝑓
2 )] sin 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 / cos 𝜃𝑖
𝑠𝑝𝑓
2   ∂𝑓12∂𝜃𝑉 = [2(𝑏22 − 𝑏11) cos(2𝜃𝑉 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) + 4𝑏12 sin(2𝜃𝑉 + 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)] sin 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓  
 
Hence,  ∂𝑓1∂𝜃𝑉  has the common factor  sin 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓  as well as ∂𝐹1∂𝜃𝑉  with the phase indices included. For the similar reason, sin 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 is also the common factor in  ∂𝐹2∂𝜃𝑉 , ∂𝐹2∂𝜃𝐼 , ∂𝐹3∂𝜃𝐼 , ∂𝐹4∂𝜃𝑉 , and ∂𝐹4∂𝜃𝐼 . Also, let ∂∆𝐽∂𝜃𝑉 = 0 or ∂∆𝐽∂𝜃𝐼 = 0, and solve 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 0 within 
[-π, π], ∆𝐽 finds the unique minimum, i.e., 0, under any values 
of 𝝌. Then, 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) = 𝐽0 holds at 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 = 0. 
The calculation results of 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓)  in (33) from an 
exhaustive search method are shown in Fig.7. It is also shown 
that 𝐽(𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓) is a unimodal function of 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑓 . 
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